Ethical Issues in the News

Political Hostage Taking?

Incidents involving hostage-taking for political or religious reasons are not as uncommon in the news as we would like. They are a rather standard part of some groups’ political arsenal. And, whereas it seems obvious that the immorality of kidnapping makes it an illegitimate political strategy, explaining what exactly makes it immoral is not easy. We are, however, in need of an explanation - not just to satisfy our intellectual curiosity, but also because our conception of the sources of its immorality will shape our reaction to reported cases of kidnapping, as well as our attitudes towards the kidnappers and their political communities and causes. Moreover, if we do not have a clear idea of what it is that makes such acts wrong, our emotional reactions are liable to be more easily manipulated by others, including the media and the offenders themselves, and our attitudes and actions towards the responsible political or religious groups may well be simply mistaken.

On February 19, 2006, nine foreign oil workers were kidnapped by militants in Warri, Nigeria. The militant group, The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, demanded that Nigeria’s federal government release two of their region’s leaders from prison, and a greater share of proceeds from the oil pumped from beneath their lands. One of the hostages, Macon Hawkins of Texas, who suffers from diabetes, was unexpectedly freed during a press visit of the militant strongholds on March 1. After his release, Hawkins declared: “I have no animosity toward [the kidnappers] at all. I’ve seen their little villages, they’re dirt poor, poor as field mice.”

In reading the story as reported by, for example, CNN, some will surely share Hawkins’ reaction. The story underlines Hawkins’ lack of ill will, his sympathy for the militants’ concerns, the poverty of the militants and their humane treatment of the hostages. Hawkins received his diabetes medication during captivity. All hostages were treated well, fed twice a day, etc. Evidently they spent much of their time chatting. Hawkins was freed on his birthday, and his release was not part of a deal.

Hawkins’ statement that he has no animosity toward the kidnappers is intriguing, and so is the reaction of a reader whose lasting impression may be of the non-violent behavior of the captors, rather than of the outrageousness of their practice of taking hostages. While one can understand sympathy for the militants’ predicaments, one would still expect a reaction of moral indignation, if not resentment, towards the militants’ actions on the part of Hawkins.

Should sympathy be his and our prevailing reaction, or should it be silenced by indignation? In sympathizing with the concerns of the group, we seem to reward their use of immoral means in furthering their political ends. On the other hand, sometimes their plight may in fact warrant sympathy and help, and once we become aware of it, at least some degree of sympathy and concern might be an appropriate moral reaction.

One of the many factors to be taken into account in considering this difficult issue is the nature and gravity of the crime committed in hostage-taking. For the crime might be such as to make sympathy towards hostage takers utterly inappropriate, or, alternatively, understandable and even to some degree warranted. Here are a couple of different ways one might think through the issue.

One might think that an action is wrong insofar as it harms someone by causing them suffering. From this point of view, kidnapping is wrong because the victim suffers as a result of deprivation of liberty, use of force, anxiety over their future, and the like. Sometimes, when the kidnapper’s main goal is to get publicity for their cause, the suffering caused to the victims is kept minimal: no violence is used, the victims are fed, etc. In these latter cases, although kidnapping is still morally wrong, it seems from this perspective to be much less so than the torture or killing of innocents.

If one takes this view, one – perhaps the victim herself - might realize that the suffering inflicted on her is nothing compared to the suffering that the militants are trying to eliminate by means of taking hostages. (Hence, possibly, the lack of resentment.) Moreover, if one follows this line of thought consistently, one may reach the conclusion that at least some cases of hostage-taking, perhaps the minimally violent ones, are morally excusable—all things considered--if the cause they serve will relieve more suffering than the kidnapping inflicts. This is not a conclusion that many would welcome, but it is an implication of this consequentialist line of thought.

An altogether different perspective is that hostage taking is wrong because it is a violation of the victim’s rights to freedom and to self-determination (that is, to live his life according to his own choices). And one might believe that the violation of these rights is an offense that can be neither justified nor compensated for by the benefits, however great, it may produce elsewhere. It has been argued that one’s capacity to make choices and to govern one’s life by them is the most essential human capacity, the capacity that makes us persons. An infringement on this capacity amounts to an infringement on our personhood, and it is therefore the kind of offense that cannot be compensated by good consequences. Although the harm caused by hostage-taking is, in some cases, less than the harm caused by killing or torture, hostage-taking is nevertheless, on this view, of comparable moral significance.

March 8, 2006

These essays are intended to foster debate and discussion on the issue addressed. This essay does not necessarily reflect the views of the Parr Center for Ethics or any of its fellows.